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"MISTAKE" AND FORUM SHOPPING IN SUITS FOR
REFUND OF FEDERAL TAX
A case recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit ' could have a significant impact on the pattern of forum shopping in
federal tax litigation. Presently the taxpayer who decides to challenge an
income, estate or gift tax assessment may choose among several courts:
he may ask the Tax Court to redetermine the amount of tax due, or else
he may pay the disputed assessment and sue for a refund either in the
Court of Claims or in a district court.2 Each court has peculiar features,3
not the least important of which are its precedents.4 Taxpayers have long
made the choice of a forum with advantageous precedents a standard part
of their pre-trial strategy.5 In the case recently before the Second Circuit,
however, it was not the taxpayer but the government which had chosen a
particular forum for strategic purposes.
The taxpayer, Russell Manufacturing Company, had established in a
previous suit in the Court of Claims 6 that, contrary to the relevant Treas-
ury Regulation, 7 distributions made by the trustee of the Company's non-
qualified 8 profit sharing plan to its beneficiaries were deductible expenses
in the year distributed. The Internal Revenue Service thought that the
decision was wrong and announced publicly that the issue would be reliti-
gated in other cases.9 Nevertheless, in response to threats by Russell to
bring suit again in the Court of Claims in connection with distributions
made in years subsequent to those before the court in its initial deter-
mination, the Service made additional refunds to Russell. Subsequently,
in an action in the Court of Claims involving another taxpayer, the gov-
ernment failed once more to convince that court that the Regulation was
I United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1965).
2 See, e.g., Gannett, Pre-Trial Strategy in a Tax Case: Choice of Forum: A
Checklist of Points to Consider, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAx 75 (1964).
3 For example: the Court of Claims uses an unusual trial commissioner fact-
finding procedure; a jury trial is available only in a district court; persons other than
lawyers may be admitted to practice before the Tax Court; discovery procedures
differ among the courts; the taxpayer is charged interest on unpaid deficiency assess-
ments when he litigates in the Tax Court.
4 Gannett, supra note 2, at 88-90.
4 See Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 1393, 1402-04 (1938).
6 Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct Cl. 1959).
7 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (p)-11 (1943), as amended, T.D. 5666, 1948-2 CuM.
Bu.L. 46.
8 To be "qualified" for various tax advantages presently provided by §§ 402-04
of the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, a profit sharing plan must benefit a certain percentage
of employees and not discriminate in favor of officers and other highly compensated
personnel. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
9 Rev. Rul. 59-383, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 456.
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correct.10 Since all informed taxpayers in future disputes with the Service
on this same point would probably choose to litigate in the Court of Claims,
whose decisions are reviewable only by the Supreme Court, the chance that
there would soon develop a conflict of decisions among the courts of appeals
and the Court of Claims on the correctness of the Regulation was small
and, in consequence, it was unlikely that the Supreme Court would grant
certiorari in a case involving the Regulation." In an effort to create a
conflict of decisions so that the Supreme Court would be more likely to
grant certiorari and uphold the Regulation,' 2 the government filed suit in
the District Court for the District of Connecticut to recover the tax re-
funded to Russell on the years not involved in the prior Court of Claims
litigation. The government's theory was that the tax was "erroneously
refunded" and therefore recoverable under section 7405(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.13
The Second Circuit, affirming the district court, denied the govern-
ment a recovery.' 4 Since judge Friendly, speaking for the court, was not
persuaded that the Court of Claims' decisions were incorrect, and since
the Service had not made the refund because of a misapprehension of either
law or fact, he reasoned that the government had not made a "mistake"
(which he equated with the statutory phrase "erroneously refunded") and,
therefore, had not satisfied its burden of proving that the taxpayer had
money which ex aequo et bono he ought not to retain.15
This reasoning may have significant implications for refund suits
brought by taxpayers. When a taxpayer finds that the precedents in
one court are unfavorable and he deliberately pays a disputed assessment
in order to sue for his refund in a court with more advantageous precedents,
he does not make a "mistake" any more than did the Service in Russell.
Furthermore, it is common for the same taxpayer who loses in one court
to win a refund on other years or separable transactions, as the govern-
ment attempted to in Russell, by arguing an identical legal theory to a
10 Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. United States, 314 F.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
11 The reluctance of the Court to grant certiorari until a conflict develops, and
the consequent delay in obtaining an authoritative construction of the law, have at
various times prompted proposals for reform. E.g., Del Cotto, The Need for a Court
of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a Study, 12 BuwFALO L. REv. 5 (1962) ; Griswold,
The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1944).
12 United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13, 17 n.4 (Zd Cir. 1965).
'3 Any portion of a tax imposed by this title which has been erroneously
refunded (if such refund would not be considered as erroneous under section
6514) may be recovered by civil action brought in the name of the United
States.
INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 7405 (b). Section 6514 defines as erroneous refunds made
after expiration of the statutes of limitations. These are recoverable under § 7405 (a).
14United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.), affirming 245 F.
Supp. 159 (D. Conn. 1965).
15 Id. at 16-18. The government's alternative argument that the Service had been
mistaken with reference to the application of collateral estoppel to the years not
involved in the Court of Claims litigation was also rejected because, assuming there
had been such a mistake, it had not induced the refund and was therefore inconse-
quential. Id. at 18-19.
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second court. 16 If factors other than an independent consideration of the
application of the revenue statutes to the transaction are applied to deter-
mine whether the taxpayer is entitled under these circumstances to a re-
fund, the taxpayer's choice of courts may be considerably restricted.
In the area of taxation where statutes usually are controlling, the
statutory law relevant to the recovery of overpayments made by either the
government or the taxpayer makes only narrow changes in the common law
action for money had and received, in which the plaintiff carries the burden
of proving that the defendant has money which ex aequo et bono he ought
not to retain. Section 7405, as Judge Friendly observed,'1 was intended
merely to limit the number of years in which the government could bring
an action to recover erroneous payments from the Treasury, since without
such a specific statutory provision the statute of limitations would not run
against the sovereign. The Internal Revenue Code provisions relevant to
taxpayer refund suits consist merely of conditions precedent to suit's that
do not fundamentally modify the common law action. Although the lan-
guage of the statute conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims and
the district courts in revenue suits appears to grant taxpayers a blanket
right to recover any erroneous or excessive payment,19 the section was
intended merely as the consent of the sovereign to be sued.2 ° Thus, to
recover a refund the taxpayer is required to prove, just as the government
was in Russell, that the defendant has money which ex aequo et bono it
ought not to retain.21 Until now, courts determining this question have
been concerned primarily with whether the payment was required under
a proper construction of the revenue statutes.22  judge Friendly thought
that under the facts of Russell other considerations also were relevant.
Among the factors that Judge Friendly apparently thought relevant
was the Internal Revenue Service's full knowledge at the time of making
'6E.g., compare Ryman v. Tomlinson, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9741 (S.D. Fla.
1956), udth Harold E. Ryman, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1093 (1953).
17 349 F.2d at 16.
18 Owen v. United States, 277 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1960) (per curiam) ; Sullivan
v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
'o28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (1964):
The district court shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court
of Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without author-
ity or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrong-
fully collected under the internal-revenue laws ....
20 The Congressman who introduced the statute explained that it was designed
to provide an action against the United States where a common law action against
the Collector was impossible. 61 CONG. Rxc. 7506-07 (1921) (remarks of Mr. Jones).
21 Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1937) ; Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281,
283 (1932); United States Paper Exports Ass'n v. Bowers, 80 F.2d 82, 84-85 (2d
Cir. 1935); United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 402-03 (1934)
(dictum).
22See Brrm, FEDmAL INCOmE, ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 23-28 (1964);
BRABsoN, FEDERAL TAXATION: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 18 (1965).
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the refund of all the facts and of the conflict of its belief that Russell was
not entitled under the Regulation to the deduction with the law as an-
nounced by the Court of Claims 23 Although this contrasts nicely with the
usual definition of mistake,24 it should not alone be sufficient to establish
that the plaintiff has no right to recover. Mistake, or the absence of it,
has no independent significance in actions for restitution, but is relevant
only insofar as it bears on the equity of permitting the defendant to retain
the payment made by the plaintiff.25 Although at common law it was not
thought inequitable for the recipient to retain a payment made voluntarily
with full knowledge of the facts and in the belief that it was not due,2 6 the
government was allowed to recover such voluntary payments. 2 7 Taxpayers
have been given the same right by statute.28 Thus neither the government
nor the taxpayer should be barred from recovering simply because at the
time of payment it knew all the facts and was aware of its legal position
that the payment was not due.
29
In Russell the absence of mistake might have been thought significant
because it enabled the government to shop for precedents. Judge Friendly
observed that there would have been no equity in the suit if the government
had deliberately made the refund in order to bar Russell from the Court
of Claims.30 The unspoken premise was that precedent shopping by the
government is inequitable.
23 See 349 F.2d at 17.
24
E.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 6 (1937) : "Mistake means a state of
mind not in accord with the facts."
25 See, e.g., Northrop's Ex'rs v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, 553-61 (1849) ; Appleton
Bank v. McGilvray, 70 Mass. 518, 522 (1855); Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005,
1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680-81 (K.B. 1760).
268KEENE, QUASI-CONTRACS 26-27 (1893).
27 Hunter v. United States, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 173, 187-88 (1831).
28 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7422(b) : "Such suit or proceeding may be main-
tained whether or not such tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.'
If the mistake argument of Russell were applied to bar taxpayers from recovering
deliberate overpayment in spite of this statute, the development would have its parallel
in a similar Pennsylvania experience. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's narrow
construction of a state statute with language similar to both § 7422(b) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a) (1) (1964), however, evoked a prompt corrective response from the Penn-
sylvania legislature. Compare Pa. Laws 1943, act 162, §§ 1-2 (compelling refund of
tax "erroneously or inadvertently paid"), construed in Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Forward
Township School Dist, 366 Pa. 489, 78 A.2d 253 (1951), to include only tax paid
under a mistake of fact, and in Jefferson Memorial Park v. West Jefferson Hills
School Dist., 397 Pa. 629, 156 A.2d 861 (1959), to exclude deliberate payments, with
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5566(b), (c) (Supp. 1965) (compelling refund of any tax
"paid . . . voluntarily or under protest . . . to which the political subdivision is
not legally entitled . ... ).
29 Of course this may be one of the constituent elements of an estoppel. See
generally Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied Against
the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAx L. REv. 487, 488-89 (1964).
On the facts of Russell, however, other elements essential to an estoppel were absent.
No detrimental reliance on the finality of the refund was shown. Even if it had been
shown, it is arguable that it was not justifiable since the statute of limitations implies
that an action to recover a refund may be brought within the prescribed period.
Moreover, an estoppel is applied only reluctantly against the government. Id. at
489-92; Maguire & Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation,
48 HAav. L. REv. 1281, 1299-1310 (1935).
30 349 F.2d at 17.
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A recovery which results from the careful choice of a favorable court
to decide the case may at first seem difficult to justify, but such pre-trial
strategy is an everyday occurrence.3 ' In the tax area, precedent shopping
appears to be a natural consequence of the court system established by
Congress. Congress must have understood that the several independent
courts to which it granted jurisdiction in revenue suits would develop
and follow their own precedents. Furthermore, although the mere existence
of several independent courts may not compel the inference that Congress
intended the litigants to have a conscious choice of precedents, the tax-
payers' notorious exercise of this choice 32 without objection suggests that
it is not an accidental characteristic of the system. 33
If the argument that Congress either built precedent shopping into
the court system or has ratified it by long continued acquiescence is rejected
and precedent shopping is considered inequitable when practiced by the
government, then it also should be inequitable when practiced by a tax-
payer. There is no indication in the statutes that taxpayers should have
the exclusive right to shop for precedents.34  Thus, if the decision in
Russell rested on the inequity of government precedent shopping, a tax-
payer also might be barred from recovering a refund whenever he de-
liberately paid a disputed assessment for the purpose of choosing a forum
more favorable than the Tax Court. To force cases into the Tax Court
in this manner may be desirable because of the special expertise of that
tribunal and because a somewhat greater uniformity in the application of
the tax laws could be expected,35 but to restrict the taxpayer's access to
other courts would be perilously close to doing that which Congress in
the past has considered and rejected.36
On the other hand, allowing both the government and the taxpayer
to shop for precedents would neither distort the system of independent
courts nor deprive the taxpayer of access to the different courts with their
special features. In addition, the government would not have an unrea-
sonable advantage. The taxpayer would have the first choice, built into
the system, of resisting the deficiency in the Tax Court; only if he chose
to pay could the government make a refund and sue for its recovery in an
31 See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (federal diversity
jurisdiction). The plaintiff, of course, has his choice of state law whenever the
defendant can be sued in more than one jurisdiction.
82 Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1393, 1403-04 (1938).
83 The "re-enactment doctrine" is based on similar logic. Cf. National Lead Co.
v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1920) ; Korth v. Mountain City Copper Co.,
174 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1949).
-4 See Southern Md. Agricultural Ass'n v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 100, 102
(D. Md. 1954).
35 This would be so because, although decisions of the Tax Court are appealable
to all the courts of appeals, only a relatively small number of cases actually are appealed.
See BiTT-.R, FEDERAL INcomE, ESTATE AND GmFr TAXATioN 904 (1964).
3 6 Compare H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1925), with H.R. REP.
No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1926).
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appropriate district court.37 Thus the taxpayer would still be able to
elect a jury trial and to save interest charges. The benefits of precedent
shopping itself would be divided, the taxpayer having the initial choice
while the government could exercise its option to choose a favorable dis-
trict court only after the taxpayer elected not to resist the deficiency in the
Tax Court. This seems more reasonable than permitting taxpayers alone
to shop for precedents. While taxpayers use this advantage solely for
their selfish interests, the Internal Revenue Service could use precedent
shopping, as it attempted to in Russell, to aid in administering the tax
laws. Even if the purposes for which the Service chose to shop for
precedents were unreviewed by the court, there is no reason to believe
that this power would be used irresponsibly. As the agency established
by Congress to administer the tax laws, the Internal Revenue Service is
not out to squeeze the last drop of revenue from the public; it should, and
probably does 3 8 use its power fairly to give effect to Congress' choice of
transactions to be taxed and its method of taxing them. Since it would
not unfairly disadvantage taxpayers to permit the government to share
with them the benefits of precedent shopping, there is no reason which
compels the courts to confer on taxpayers the exclusive right to shop
for precedents-an advantage which Congress has not seen fit to confer
by statute.
Thus, not only is the absence of mistake inconclusive of whether
there is a right to restitution, but also the presence of precedent shopping,
practiced by either the government or a taxpayer, is consistent with both
a reasonable system of adjusting tax liability and with the statutory frame-
work provided by Congress-prohibiting precedent shopping or permitting
its practice only by taxpayers is not.
The reference to mistake and precedent shopping in Russell was
actually unnecessary in determining whether the taxpayer should have
retained the refunds. In his opinion Judge Friendly stated that if he were
persuaded that the Court of Claims decisions rejecting the Regulation were
incorrect the government would have been entitled to recover.3 9 This is
not significantly different from the approach generally followed of deter-
mining whether the defendant has money which ex aequo et bono he ought
not to retain by asking whether the tax is due under a proper construction
of the revenue statutes. 40 In Russell no more was necessary.
In fact it was unnecessary even to make an exhaustive inquiry into
the correctness of the Court of Claims decisions. Although relitigation
3 7 Under the venue provisions of the judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c)
(1964), this would be in the judicial district where the taxpayer resides if he is an
individual, or in the judicial district where a corporate taxpayer is "incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business."
38 Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied Against
the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAX L. REv. 487, 489 (1964).
39 349 F.2d at 17.
40 See authorities cited note 22 supra.
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of the same controversy involving the same taxpayer probably is not fore-
closed by collateral estoppel if the prior suit dealt with different years
or separable transactions, 41 the prior decision at least inclines the same court
toward a determination consistent with its own precedent. Moreover, the
prior decision may well have enhanced persuasiveness for another inde-
pendent court deciding the tax consequences of an essentially identical
transaction involving the same parties.4 2  This may explain why Judge
Friendly conspicuously deferred to the reasonableness of the Court of
Claims decisions, and dismissed the question of the correctness of the
Regulation simply by noting that the statutory language appeared to sup-
port Russell's right to the deduction.43  Thus, although a review of the
issue is not completely foreclosed by collateral estoppel, a lawsuit initiated
by either a taxpayer or the government may be unlikely to succeed if it is
based on the same theory rejected in a prior suit between the same parties.44
Where the taxpayer involved has not litigated the issue and the court has
no precedent on point, the decision of another court will have no more
than ordinary persuasiveness. Thus, if the government were to pay a
refund claim based on the invalidity of the disputed Regulation to another
taxpayer who had never before litigated the point and were then to bring
suit for its recovery in a court which had not before decided the issue, it
should be entitled to a decision based on an independent interpretation of
the statute and not on the presence or absence of "mistake" or on the
supposed inequity of precedent shopping.
Since the decision in Russell might have been based on statute and
precedent, it is regrettable that the opinion introduced unnecessarily broad
grounds, with import in areas far beyond the case before the court and
bound up with history and practice it never considered.
41 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948) ; Developments in the Law
-Res .udicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818, 943-44 (1952). Contra, United States v.
Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1965) (dictum).
42 Some courts of appeals feel that the need for national uniformity in the tax
laws is sufficient reason to adopt the reasonable interpretation of another circuit.
Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Commissioner v. Moran,
236 F.2d 595, 596 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Grimland v. United States, 206 F.2d 599 (10th
Cir. 1953).
43 349 F.2d at 16-17.
44 Branscomb, Collateral Estoppel in Tax Cases: Static and Separable Facts,
37 TEXAs L. REv. 584, 595-96 (1959).
